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Abstract
We study the problem of selﬁsh routing in the pres-
ence of incomplete network information. Our model
consists of a number of users who wish to route their
traﬃc on a network of m parallel links with the objec-
tive of minimizing their latency. However, in doing so,
they face the challenge of lack of precise information
on the capacity of the network links. This uncertainty
is modelled via a set of probability distributions over all
the possibilities, one for each user. The resulting model
is an amalgamation of the KP-model of [13] and the
congestion games with user-speciﬁc functions of [17].
We embark on a study of Nash equilibria and the
price of anarchy in this new model. In particular,
we propose polynomial-time algorithms for computing
some special cases of pure Nash equilibria and we show
that negative results of [17], for the non-existence of
pure Nash equilibria in the case of three users, do not
apply to our model. Consequently, we propose an inter-
esting open problem in this area, that of the existence of
pure Nash equilibria in the general case of our model.
Furthermore, we consider appropriate notions for the
social cost and the price of anarchy and obtain upper
bounds for the latter. With respect to fully mixed Nash
equilibria, we propose a method to compute them and
show that when they exist they are unique. Finally we
prove that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium maximizes
the social welfare.
1. Introduction
In their pioneering work Koutsoupias and Papadim-
itriou [13] introduce a non-cooperative weighted conges-
tion game (named in the literature as the KP-model)
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where n selﬁsh users wish to route their unsplitable
traﬃc onto m parallel links from a source to a destina-
tion. In this class of games, each link has a certain ca-
pacity representing the rate at which the link processes
traﬃc, and users have complete knowledge of the sys-
tem’s parameters such as the link capacities and the
traﬃc of other users. Furthermore, users choose how
to route their traﬃc based on a common payoﬀ func-
tion, which essentially captures the delay to be experi-
enced on each link. However, modern non-cooperative
systems, such as computer networks and the Internet,
which have motivated the study of games such as that
of [13], present incomplete information on various as-
pects of their behavior. For example, it is often the
case that network users have incomplete information
regarding the link capacities. Such uncertainty may
arise if the network links represent complex paths cre-
ated by routers which are constructed diﬀerently on
separate occasions according to the presence of conges-
tion or link failures.
In this paper we introduce an extension of the KP-
model that captures these more realistic network sce-
narios. We consider a model where the network links
are associated with a number of diﬀerent capacities and
each user’s uncertainty about the capacity of the links
is modelled via a probability distribution over all the
possibilities. We assume that users may have diﬀerent
sources of information regarding the network, there-
fore, we take their probability distributions to be dis-
tinct from one another. This gives rise to a model with
user-speciﬁc payoﬀ functions, where each user uses its
distinct probability distribution to take decisions as to
how to route its traﬃc.
We may see that our model subsumes the KP-model
since, in the case of users assigning probability one to
the same capacity for each link, the two models coin-
cide. Moreover, our model turns out to be an instance
of weighted congestion games with user-speciﬁc func-
tions studied by Milchtaich in [17].We are interested in algorithmic problems related
to Nash equilibria for the routing game we consider,
that is, steady states in the game where no user has
an incentive to unilaterally change its strategy. For
example, we are interested in deciding whether and
when Nash equilibria exist in our model, and, if so,
determine eﬃciently the users strategies that give rise
to these equilibria. We are concerned with both pure
and mixed Nash equilibria, that is equilibria where the
strategy of each user is a single link, or a probabil-
ity distribution over links, respectively. Furthermore,
we study two notions for the social cost of the game
and associated notions for the price of anarchy or co-
ordination ratio [13] which captures the performance
degradation in the game due to the lack of coordina-
tion among the users.
Prior Work. Congestion games were ﬁrst intro-
duced by Rosenthal [23] and studied extensively there-
after. Rosenthal showed that these games admit pure
Nash equilibria by using the notion of potential func-
tions. Subsequent related work (e.g. [3, 18]) character-
ized games that admit potential functions as potential
games. The problem of computing pure Nash equi-
libria was studied for congestion games in [3] and for
weighted congestion games in [6]. The KP-Model [13]
and its Nash Equilibria were studied extensively in the
last years; see, for example, [2, 4, 6, 12, 15, 16] and [5]
for a survey. Feldmann et al. [4] and Gairing et al. [7]
propose algorithms to transform any user strategy to
a Nash equilibrium without increasing the maximum
congestion. Fully mixed Nash equilibria for the KP-
model were ﬁrst studied in [16]. The fully mixed Nash
equilibrium conjecture, stating that the fully mixed
Nash equilibrium has the worst social cost among all
Nash equilibria, was ﬁrst formulated in [7] and it was
veriﬁed in [14] for a social cost deﬁned as the sum of
the users latencies.
The notion of the price of anarchy was ﬁrst intro-
duced and studied in the KP-Model [22]. Subsequently,
tight bounds were proposed for it in [2, 12] for identical
links, in [2] for related links, and in [1] for congestion
games with linear latency functions.
Gairing et al. [8] were the ﬁrst to consider an ex-
tension of the KP-model with incomplete information.
Their model considers a game of parallel links with in-
complete information on the traﬃcs of the users, which
makes it complementary to our work. The payoﬀ func-
tions employed by the users, which are universal and
not user speciﬁc, take into account probabilistic infor-
mation on the user traﬃcs. Based on the seminal work
by Harsanyi [11], the authors show that their model
always admits a pure Nash equilibrium and propose an
algorithm for computing such an equilibrium for some
special cases. Also they show that the fully mixed Nash
equilibrium maximizes the social cost for special cases
of their model and that, in the general case, more than
one fully mixed Nash equilibrium may exist. Finally,
they show asymptotically-tight upper bounds on the
coordination ratio.
Milchtaich [17] studied congestion games in which
the payoﬀ function associated with each user is not uni-
versal but user-speciﬁc. He shows that these games do
not admit a pure Nash equilibrium in the general case,
but are guaranteed to exhibit such equilibria in special
cases, such as the case of unweighted users. Our work
is closely related to [17] since our game is an instance
of that model. Thus we inherit the positive results ob-
tained therein. However, we show that the negative
results of [17] do not necessarily apply for our model.
Contribution. The contributions of our work are
summarized as follows:
• We present an interesting new model that captures
the idea of the uncertainty of the network state by
deﬁning appropriate user-speciﬁc payoﬀ functions.
• We propose polynomial-time algorithms for com-
puting some special cases of pure Nash equilibria
and we demonstrate that the counter-example pre-
sented in [17] showing that pure Nash equilibria
do not exist in the general case does not apply in
our model. Thus, we identify an interesting open
problem in this area, that of existence of pure Nash
equilibria in the general case.
• We identify and employ two diﬀerent expressions
for the social cost and the associated notions for
the price of anarchy. We obtain upper bounds for
the latter in the general case and for special in-
stances.
• We compute the fully mixed Nash equilibrium and
show that when it exists it is unique. Also we
show that for certain instances of the game all fully
mixed Nash equilibria assign all links to all users
equiprobably.
• Finally, we prove that the fully mixed Nash equi-
librium maximizes the social welfare.
Document Structure. The paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model. In Sec-
tion 3 we consider questions of existence and compu-
tation of pure Nash equilibria for special cases of our
model and we state our conjecture for the existence of
pure Nash equilibria in the general case. In Section 4we study fully mixed Nash equilibria and we give some
upper bounds for the coordination ratio. Finally, some
of the omitted proofs can be found in [9].
2. Model and Deﬁnitions
Network. For all k ∈ N, denote [k]={1,2,...k}.
We consider a network consisting of a set of m parallel
links 1,2,...,m, or simply links, from a source to a
destination, and n network users 1,2,...,n, or simply
users, who wish to route their traﬃc along a link from
the source to the destination. We assume that n>1
and m>1. (Throughout, we will be using subscripts
for users and superscripts for links.) We denote by
wi > 0 the traﬃc of network user i ∈ [n]. We deﬁne w
as the n × 1 vector containing the traﬃcs of all users.
States. In our model, we assume that there ex-
ists uncertainty regarding the capacity of the network
links. Thus, we deﬁne a state to be an m × 1 vector,
 c1,c 2,...,c m  where, for all   ∈ [m], c  > 0 represents
the capacity of link  .T h estate space of the network,
denoted by Φ, is deﬁned as the set containing all the
possible states the network may realize. We let φ range
over Φ and we write c 
φ for the capacity of link   ac-
cording to state φ.
Beliefs. Each user, based on some private knowledge,
may have a diﬀerent belief regarding the capacity of the
network links. We assume that this knowledge is proba-
bilistic and it has the form of a probability distribution
function over the set of all states. In general, we write
b ∈ ∆(Φ) to denote a belief probability distribution
over all states, and bi for the belief of user i ∈ [n]. Fur-
thermore, we write b(φ) for the probability assigned to
state φ by belief b. We deﬁne the belief proﬁle B to be
the n × 1 vector  b1,b 2,...,b n  containing the beliefs
of all users.
Games. We consider the routing game G =
(n,m,w,B) where n is the number of users, m is the
number of links, w is a traﬃc vector and B a belief
proﬁle. A special instance of this model is the KP-
model [13]. This arises whenever, for some φ ∈ Φ,
bi(φ) = 1 for all i ∈ [n].
Strategies. For the remainder of the section let us
ﬁx a game G =( n,m,w,B). A pure strategy for a user
i ∈ [n] is the selection of some link   ∈ [m]. A pure
strategies proﬁle is an n-tuple   1,  2,...,  n ∈[m]n of
pure actions, one for each user, where  i is the selection
of user i ∈ [n]. A mixed strategy for a user i ∈ [n]i s
a probability distribution ∆([m]) over pure strategies,
that is, over the set of links. We denote the probability
assigned by user i ∈ [n] to link   ∈ [m]b yp 
i.A
mixed strategies proﬁle is an n × m probability matrix
P, where P[i, ]=p 
i is the probability that user i
chooses link  .T h esupport of the mixed strategy for
user i is the set {  ∈ [m] | p 
i > 0}.
Latency. For a pure strategies proﬁle σ =
  1,  2,...,  n ,t h elatency cost of user i ∈ [n] in state
φ, denoted by λi,φ(σ), is
 
k: k= i wk
c
 i
φ
.
On the other hand, the expected latency cost of user
i ∈ [n] with belief bi over all states, denoted by λi,bi (σ)
is  
φ∈Φ
bi(φ) · λi,φ(σ) .
For a mixed strategies proﬁle P, denote W  the ex-
pected traﬃc on link   ∈ [m], W  =
 n
i=1 p 
i · wi.D e -
note W as the m × 1 matrix containing the expected
traﬃcs on each link. Furthermore, the expected latency
cost for user i ∈ [n] with belief bi on link   ∈ [m],
denoted by λ 
i,bi (P), is the expectation over all possi-
ble states and over all random choices of the remaining
users, of the latency cost for user i when its traﬃc is
assigned to link  .T h u s ,
λ 
i,bi (P)=
 
φ∈Φ
bi(φ) ·
wi +
 n
k=1,k =i p 
kwk
c 
φ
=
 
φ∈Φ
bi(φ) ·
wi − p 
iwi +
 n
k=1 p 
kwk
c 
φ
=
 
φ∈Φ
bi(φ) ·
(1 − p 
i)wi + W 
c 
φ
.
For each user i ∈ [n], with belief bi,t h eminimum ex-
pected latency cost λi,bi (P) is the minimum, over all
links   ∈ [m], of the expected latency cost for user i of
belief bi on link  :
λi,bi (P) = min
 ∈[m]
λ 
i,bi (P) (1)
When P is inferred from the context we simply write
λ 
i,bi, λi,bi.
For simplicity, we employ the notation c 
i =
1
 
φ∈Φ
bi(φ)
c 
φ
. Now the expected latency cost of user i
can be written as
λ 
i,bi =
(1 − p 
i)wi + W 
c 
i
.Solving for p 
i we have that for every user i ∈ [n]a n d
link   ∈ [m]
p 
i =
W  + wi − c 
iλi,b
wi
(2)
Nash Equilibrium. The notion of a Nash equilib-
rium [20, 21] is deﬁned for our model in the usual way.
Speciﬁcally, a probability matrix P is a Nash equilib-
rium (often abbreviated as NE), if, for all users i ∈ [n]
and for all links   ∈ [m]:
λ 
i,bi
 
= λi,bi, if p 
i > 0
≥ λi,bi, if p 
i =0
Thus, each user assigns its traﬃc with positive prob-
ability only on links for which its expected latency cost
is minimized. This implies that there is no incentive
for a user to unilaterally deviate from its strategy to
improve its expected latency cost. We refer to proba-
bilities in a Nash equilibrium as Nash probabilities.
Social Cost and Coordination Ratio. Associated
with a routing game G =( n,m,w,B) and a mixed
probability matrix P is the Social Cost denoted by
SC(G,P). Since every user’s belief for the capacities of
the network diﬀers, there is no objective value for the
latency of a link or for the exact congestion of the net-
work. Thus, we are forced to depart from the standard
deﬁnition for the social cost employed in the literature
(the expected maximum congestion), and we consider
two social cost deﬁnitions that take into account the
subjective user beliefs as follows:
• the sum of their individual cost: SC1 (G,P)=  n
i=1 λi,bi (P)
• the maximum of their individual cost:
SC2 (G,P) = maxi∈[n] λi,bi (P)
Similarly, we give two deﬁnitions for the Social Opti-
mum, or simply the Optimum, associated with a rout-
ing game G =( n,m,w,B), denoted by OPT(G), as
the minimum over all pure assignments of
• the sum of their individual cost: OPT1 (G)=
minσ∈[m]n
 n
i=1 λi,bi(σ)
• the maximum of their individual cost:
OPT2 (G) = minσ∈[m]n maxi∈[n] λi,bi(σ)
The above notions give rise to two deﬁnitions
for the Coordination Ratio for our model: CRi =
max
G,P
SCi(G,P)
OPTi (G)
,f o ri ∈{ 1,2}.
3. Pure Nash Equilibria
In this section we consider the problem of existence
of pure Nash equilibria for our model. It is well known
([3, 23]) that any unweighted congestion game has a
pure Nash equilibium. Furthermore, in the KP-model
pure NE exist and can be eﬃciently computed [6]. On
the other hand, in [17] it is shown that weighted conges-
tion games with user-speciﬁc functions do not always
possess a pure NE. Speciﬁcally, a counter-example with
three users and three resources (links) is given. For our
model, a special case of the games of [17] and an ex-
tension of [22], we inherit the positive results of [17].
However, we show that the counter-example of [17] is
not valid for our model, since it can be shown that for
games with three users NE always exist. In this section,
we present polynomial-time algorithms for computing
pure Nash equilibria for a number of special cases and
we conclude with the conjecture that pure NE exist in
the general case in our model.
3.1 Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Spe-
cial Cases
The case of m =2links
First we consider the case of an arbitrary number of
users n and m = 2 links. In fact, our algorithm solves
the more general problem of existence of pure NE in the
case where the links have some initial traﬃc t =  t1,t 2 ,
where ti is the initial traﬃc of link i ∈ [m]. First, we
have a useful deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Consider a game G =( n,2,w,B)
with initial traﬃc t =  t1,t 2 . We deﬁne the toler-
ance of user i for link j as the value α
j
i which satisﬁes
tj + α
j
i
c
j
i
=
tj⊕1 + T − α
j
i + wi
c
j⊕1
i
where T =
 
i∈[n] wi and a ⊕ b =( a + b)mod 2.
Thus, given a two-link game with an associated load
T to be assigned on the two links, the tolerance of user
i for a link j, α
j
i, is the maximum fragment of the
load T the user can tolerate on link j while routing its
traﬃc on it. This implies that, if link j has load α
j
i
(and consequently link j ⊕ 1 has load T − α
j
i), user i
has no incentive to change its strategy. We have the
following lemma:
Lemma 3.2 Consider a strategy   1,...,  n  in the
game G =( n,2,w,B) and suppose  1 = 1. Then, user
1 satisﬁes the NE condition
t1 +
 
 i=1 wi
c1
1
≤
t2 +
 
 i=2 wi + w1
c2
1if and only if
 
 i=1 wi ≤ α1
1.
Proof. First suppose that
 
 i=1 wi ≤ α1
1.W eh a v e
t1 +
 
 i=1 wi
c1
1
≤
t1 + α1
1
c1
1
=
t2 +
 
i∈[n] wi − α1
1 + w1
c2
1
≤
t2 +
 
i∈[n] wi −
 
 i=1 wi + w1
c2
1
=
t2 +
 
 i=2 wi + w1
c2
1
as required. To prove the other way round, suppose  
 i=1 wi >α 1
1.W eh a v e
t1 +
 
 i=1 wi
c1
1
>
t1 + α1
1
c1
1
=
t2 +
 
i∈[n] wi − α1
1 + w1
c2
1
>
t2 +
 
i∈[n] wi −
 
 i=1 wi + w1
c2
1
=
t2 +
 
 i=2 wi + w1
c2
1
which completes the proof. 
Figure 1 presents Algorithm Atwolinks which solves
the problem in O(n2). It behaves greedily by select-
ing the user, k, with the highest tolerance over the
two links, and it assigns k on the speciﬁc link,  k.I t
then proceeds to recursively construct an assignment
for the remaining users in the same network, but where
the initial load on link  k is increased by wk. Here-
after, for σ =   1,...,  x , we write σ[k  →  ], for
  1,...,  k−1, ,  k−1,...,  x .
Theorem 3.3 For any game G =( n,2,w,B),a l g o -
rithm Atwolinks computes a pure Nash equilibrium in
time O(n2).
Proof. We will prove the theorem by induction on n.
Clearly, for n = 1 the claim holds. Assume that the
claim holds for any game with n = ν. We will show that
it holds for n = ν + 1. Consider the execution of the
algorithm with input a game G with n = ν +1 ,a n d
an initial traﬃc vector t. The algorithm returns the
strategy σν+1 = σν[k  →  k], where σν is the strategy
returned by the recursive call Atwolinks(G ,t ). By the
induction hypothesis, since G  has n = ν, σν is a pure
NE for Gν and t . We have to show that σν+1 is a pure
Nash equilibrium for game Gν+1 and initial vector t.
First note that, all users in Gν satisfy the NE condition
for game Gν+1 and initial vector t. It remains to show
that this assignment is also acceptable for user k.L e t
N1, N2 be the sets of users playing on links 1 and 2,
respectively, in game σν. Two cases exist:
Algorithm Atwolinks(G,t)
Input:Ag a m eG =( n,2,w,B)a n dat r a ﬃ cv e c t o rt =
 t1,t 2 .
Output: A pure NE σ.
1. Let σ =    and T =
 
k∈[n] wk.
2. Compute c
 
i for every user i ∈ [n] and every link
  ∈ [m].
3. For every user u ∈ [n] do:
(a) For every link j ∈ [m] do:
Compute α
j
u =
c1
uc2
u
c1
u+c2
u
 
tj⊕1+T+wu
c
j⊕1
u
−
tj
c
j
u
 
(b) Let  u =m a x ( α
1
u,α
2
u).
4. Let k ∈ [n] be the user where a
 k
k =m a x u∈[n] α
 u
u ,
and
let σ =   k  and t k = t k + wk.
5. if n =1then return σ
else
(a) Let w
  =  w1,...,w k−1,w k+1,...,w n ,
B
  =  b1,...,b k−1,b k+1,...,b n ,
G
  =( n − 1,2,w
 ,B
 ) and let t
  be the new
initial traﬃc vector.
(b) return Atwolinks (G
 ,t
 )[k  →  k].
Figure 1. Algorithm Atwolinks
• If N k = ∅, then the claim follows trivially by ob-
serving that a
 k
k ≥ wk and Lemma 3.2.
• On the other hand, if N k  = ∅ and j ∈ N k
t k + wk +
 
u∈N k
wu
c
 k
j
≤
t k⊕1 +
 
u∈N k⊕1 wu + wj
c
 k⊕1
j
,
which implies, by Lemma 3.2, that α
 k
j ≥
 
u∈N k wu+wk. Since α
 k
k ≥ α
 k
j , by Lemma 3.2,
t k + wk +
 
u∈Nk wu
c
 k
k
≤
t k⊕1 +
 
u∈N k⊕1 wu + wk
c
 k⊕1
k
which completes the proof that σν+1 is a pure
Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we may see that the complexity of the above
algorithm is given by the recursive equation T(n)=
T(n − 1) + 8n whose solution is in O(n2). 
The case of symmetric users
In this section we consider the case of symmetric users,
that is, the case where all users have identical weights,and we provide an O(n2m) algorithm for ﬁnding a pure
NE for the model. Our algorithm, Asymmetric,s h o w n
in Figure 2, follows along the lines of the constructive
proof of [17] for the same problem, for user-speciﬁc
games. The contribution of our work is a simpliﬁcation
in the correctness proof.
We will be using the following deﬁnitions and nota-
tions.
• Given a strategy σ =   1,...,  n ,  i ∈ [m], we
deﬁne the state induced by the strategy as s =
 N1,...,N m , where Ni = {j ∈ [n] |  j = i} is
the set of users assigned to link i by σ.
• Au s e ri sadefecting user in a state s if he does
not satisfy the NE property in s.
• We deﬁne the game graph of a game as the graph
whose nodes are all possible states of the game and
there exists an edge between states s and s  if s =
 N1,...,N m  and s  =  N1,...,N i −{u},...N j ∪
{u},...,N m , where u is a defecting user in s but
not in s . We write s
u −→ s .
Algorithm Asymmetric
Input: A game G =( n,m, w,...,w ,B).
Output: A pure NE σ.
1. Let |N | = 0 for all   ∈ [m]a n dσ =   .
2. Compute c
 
i for every user i ∈ [n] and every link
  ∈ [m].
3. For every user i ∈ [n] do:
(a) Let   ∈ [m] be a link such that
|N |+1
c 
i
≤
|Nj|+1
c
j
i
, ∀j  =  
(b) Assign user i on link   and set |N | = |N | +1 .
(c) while there exists user k with  k =   and
 
  ∈ [m] such that (
|N |
c 
k
>
|N  |+1
c  
k
)do:
move user k from link   to link  
 , update σ
and set
|N | = |N |−1, |N  | = |N  |+1and   =  
 
Figure 2. Algorithm Asymmetric
To prove the correctness of the algorithm we use the
following lemma:
Lemma 3.4 Consider state  N1,...,N m  where i ∈
Nj and suppose that user i satisﬁes the NE property,
that is, for all k  = j:
|Nj|
c
j
i
≤
|Nk| +1
ck
i
.
Then, for any state  L1,...,L m  satisfying |Lk|≥| Nk|
for i  = j and |Lj|≤| Nj|,u s e ri continues to satisfy
the NE property.
Proof. In the new strategy we have for any k  = j:
|Lj|
c
j
i
≤
|Nj|
c
j
i
≤
|Nk| +1
ck
i
≤
|Lk| +1
ck
i
which establishes the claim.

Theorem 3.5 Given a game G =
(n,m, w,...,w ,B), algorithm Asymmetric computes a
pure Nash equilibrium in time O(n2m).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that
wi = 1, for all i ∈ [n]. We will prove the theorem by
induction on n. Clearly, for n = 1 the claim holds.
Assume that the claim holds for n = ν − 1. We will
show that it holds for n = ν. By the induction hy-
pothesis, at the end of the (ν − 1)th iteration, ν − 1
users have been assigned on links and the assignment
induced for this game, say σν−1, is a Nash equilibrium.
In the νth iteration, user ν assigns its traﬃc on link j
which minimizes its latency (step 3(b)). Then one or
more users may wish to deviate from link j to another
link. To prove the claim we will show that σν−1 can
be transformed into a NE in O(ν) moves (step 3(c)).
Let s0 =  N1,...,N m  be the state induced by
σν−1. Suppose that, given this state, user Pν chooses
to route its traﬃc on link 1, giving rise to state
s1 =  N1 ∪{ ν},N 2,...,N m .
Suppose that this placement results in a sequence of
moves
s1
u2 −→ s2
u3 −→ s3
u4 −→ ...
where si =  N1
i ,N2
i ,...,Nm
i  . We may prove that for
all i, there exists ji such that
1. |N
ji
i | = |Nji| +1 ,a n d|N
j
i | = |Nj|,f o rj  = ji,
2. the defecting user ui+1 ∈ N
ji
i ,a n d
3. all u ∈ N
j
i , j  = ji, satisfy the NE criterion.
We may prove this by induction on i. For the base
case consider i = 1. Clearly, s1 satisﬁes property (1),
with j1 = 1. While all users in {ν}∪N2∪...∪Nm can
be seen to continue to satisfy the NE criterion in this
new state, it is possible that some user u ∈ N1
1 is no
longer satisﬁed, that is the defecting user, if one exists,
is some u ∈ N1
1.
Suppose now that the claim holds for i = k and con-
sider i = k + 1. We observe, by the induction hypoth-
esis, that, for jk+1 the new strategy of the defectingplayer uk+1, sk+1 satisﬁes property (1). In addition,
user uk+1 is satisﬁed in sk+1, and so are all users in
N
q
k+1  = N
jk+1
k+1 , which completes the induction.
Now consider users u1 = ν,u2,..., in the execution
above. We may see that, since user ui satisﬁes the NE
criterion in state si, by Lemma 3.4, he will continue
to satisfy it in every subsequent step. Thus, user ui,
will not defect in any of the moves following state si,
which implies that any user may defect at most once.
In other words, the execution is ﬁnite and will converge
to a NE in at most ν steps. This completes the proof
that σν is a pure NE.
To establish that the algorithm is in O(n2m)i ti s
suﬃcient to note that in the ith iteration of the al-
gorithm we may have at most i − 1 defecting players,
which amounts to a total of O(n2) defecting steps. The
candidate users for defection may be identiﬁed in a sin-
gle pass over all players, proceeding step(3(c)), in time
O(nm). This completes the proof. 
The case of uniform user beliefs
We now turn to the model of uniform user beliefs, that
is, games where each user believes all links to have
equal capacity. We propose an algorithm that com-
putes a pure NE for the model in the case where the
links have some initial traﬃc t =  t1,...,t m , where
ti is the initial traﬃc of link i ∈ [m]. Our algorithm,
Auniform, presented in Figure 3, is a slight modiﬁcation
of the algorithm of [6] (which in turn can be viewed as
a variant of Graham’s Longest Processing Time (LPT)
algorithm [10]) to reﬂect the needs of our model. Essen-
tially, the algorithm constructs a pure NE in a greedy
fashion by processing the users in decreasing order of
their weights, and, for each user k, it assigns the user
on its preferred link  k and proceeds with the remain-
ing users in the network where the initial load of link
 k has increased by wk.
Theorem 3.6 Given a game G =( n,m,w,B) un-
der the model of uniform user beliefs, the algorithm
Auniform computes a pure Nash equilibrium in time
O(n(log n + m)).
Proof. We will prove the theorem by induction on n.
Clearly, for n = 1 the claim holds. Assume that the
claim holds for any game with n = ν−1. We will show
that it holds for n = ν. By the induction hypothesis,
at the end of the (ν − 1)th iteration, ν − 1u s e r sh a v e
been assigned on links and the assignment induced for
this game, say σν−1, is a Nash equilibrium. In the
νth iteration, user ν, the user with the smallest weight
amongst the ν users, assigns its traﬃc on link  ν which
minimizes its latency (step 4(b)). We need to show that
Algorithm Auniform(G,t)
Input:Ag a m eG =( n,m,w,B)a n dat r a ﬃ cv e c t o rt
=  t1,...,t m .
Output: A pure NE σ.
1. Write ci = c
1
i (= c
 
i, for all  ) for every user i ∈ [n].
2. Let σ =   .
3. Sort the users in decreasing order of weights.
4. For every user i ∈ [n] do:
(a) Let  k be a link such that
wk+t k
ck ≤
wk+tj
ck ,∀j  =
 k.
(b) Assign user k on link  k and update σ accord-
ingly.
(c) Let t k = t k + wk.
Figure 3. Algorithm Auniform
the users in [ν−1] remain satisﬁed after this placement.
This clearly aﬀects only the users on link  ν. Suppose
σν−1 =   1,...  n−1 , and let Wj =
 
 u=j wu,f o re a c h
link j. Two cases exist:
• If W ν = wν, that is ν is the only user on  ν,t h e
claim follows.
• If W ν >w ν and k ∈ [ν −1] is a user with  k =  ν,
then, since user ν is in a Nash equilibrium,
W ν + t ν
cν
≤
wν + Wj + tj
cν
for all j  =  ν, which implies that W ν + t ν ≤
wν + Wj + tj, for all j  =  ν. Since wk ≥ wν,
W ν + t ν ≤ wk + Wj + tj and, consequently,
W ν + t ν
ck
≤
wk + Wj + tj
ck
for all j  =  ν. Thus, user k does not have an
incentive to change strategy, which implies that
the assignment σν is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Finally, the complexity of the algorithm is in
O(n(log n + m)). 
The case of n =3
We have shown that any game with three users has
a pure NE. The proof employs the notion of a best-
response cycle which is a cycle in the game graph
where defecting users move to the strategy that mini-
mizes their latency. Speciﬁcally, the proof establishes
in an exhaustive way that the game possesses no best-
response cycles, which implies that a pure NE exists.3.2 Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
(Conjecture)
The existence of pure Nash equilibria for this model
in the general case remains open. Work for answering
this question has been carried out in various directions.
In particular, we have shown that the game as deﬁned
in this work is not an exact potential game [18] (see [9])
and therefore it does not admit an exact potential func-
tion. Further, our game is neither an ordinal potential
game, since it has been shown that the state space of
an instance of the game contains a cycle. This inter-
esting observation is due to B. Monien [19]. Therefore,
potential functions [18], a popular method for proving
existence of NE, cannot be used for our model.
It turns out that the problem of existence of pure
NE in our model is a non-trivial problem. Our eﬀorts
in applying graph-theoretic methods and inductive ar-
guments have not been successful so far. The argu-
ments end up failing mainly due to the arbitrary rela-
tion between the diﬀerent user beliefs on the capacity
of the network links (unlike the special cases presented
before where beliefs are related or additional informa-
tion is present). Naturally, and given the non-existence
result on weighted congestion games with user spe-
ciﬁc payoﬀ-functions [17], we attempted to disprove
the existence of NE in our model. Typically, simple
counter-examples considering a small number of re-
sources (links) and users are used for such purposes (for
example, in [17], the counter example involves 3 users
and 3 resources, a scenario for which the existence has
been proved in our model). This appears not to be the
case for our model as simulations ran on numerous in-
stances of the game (dealing with small number of users
and links) suggest the existence of pure NE. Given the
lack of a simple counter-example, the polynomial-time
algorithms for special cases, and our intuition we con-
jecture that
Conjecture 3.7 For any game G =( n,m,w,B) there
is at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
4. Fully Mixed Nash Equilibria
In this section we compute the probabilities of the
fully mixed Nash equilibria for our model, if one ex-
ists. Furthermore, in the case it exists, we illustrate
its uniqueness, and that it maximizes the social cost.
Finally we show bounds on the Price of Anarchy (Co-
ordination Ratio) that hold in our model.
4.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Fully
Mixed Nash Equilibria.
We begin with the following result.
Lemma 4.1 For a game G and a Nash Equilibrium
P in the fully mixed case for every user i ∈ [n], the
minimum expected latency cost function λi,bi is,
λi,bi =
1
 
j∈[m] c
j
i

(m − 1)wi +
 
k∈[n]
wk


Proof. For every user i ∈ [n] it holds that
 
 ∈[m]
p 
i =1
(2)
⇔
 
 ∈[m]
 
W  + wi − c 
iλi,bi
wi
 
=1
⇔
1
wi
 
 ∈[m]
W  + m −
λi,bi
wi
 
 ∈[m]
c 
i =1
⇔
λi,bi
wi
 
 ∈[m]
c 
i =
1
wi
 
 ∈[m]
W  + m − 1
⇔ λi,bi
 
 ∈[m]
c 
i =( m − 1)wi +
 
 ∈[m]
W 
⇔ λi,bi
 
 ∈[m]
c 
i =( m − 1)wi +
 
 ∈[m]
 
k∈[n]
p 
kwk
=( m − 1)wi +
 
k∈[n]
wk
 
 ∈[m]
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⇔ λi,bi
 
 ∈[m]
c 
i =( m − 1)wi +
 
k∈[n]
wk
⇔ λi,bi =
1
 
 ∈[m] c 
i

(m − 1)wi +
 
k∈[n]
wk



Lemma 4.2 For a game G and a fully mixed Nash
Equilibrium P, for any   ∈ [m] we have
W
  =
1
n − 1
n  
i=1
 
(m − 1)
c
 
i  
j∈[m] c
j
i
+
n  
k=1
c
 
k  
j∈[m] c
j
k
 
wi.
Lemma 4.3 C o n s i d e rag a m eG and a fully mixed
Nash Equilibrium P.T h e n , f o r a l l u s e r s i ∈ [n] and
links   ∈ [m] we have
p
 
i =1 −
(m − 1)c
 
i  m
j=1 c
j
i
−
1
n − 1
1
wi
 
n  
k=1
wk
 
1 −
n  
k=1
c
 
k  m
j=1 c
j
k
+
(n − 1)c
 
i  m
j=1 c
j
i
 
− (m − 1)
n  
k=1
c
 
k  m
j=1 c
j
k
wk
 
Proof. It follows by substituting the results from
Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 in equation (2). Remark 4.4 Lemma 4.3 holds for every probability
matrix P where p 
i  =0and
 m
 =1 p 
i =1 .
We now relate the probabilities calculated in
Lemma 4.3 with Nash probabilities.
Lemma 4.5 If for every i ∈ [n] and every   ∈ [m]
p
 
i =1−
(m − 1)c
 
i  m
j=1 c
j
i
−
1
n − 1
1
wi
 
n  
k=1
wk
 
1 −
n  
k=1
c
 
k  m
j=1 c
j
k
+
(n − 1)c
 
i  m
j=1 c
j
i
 
− (m − 1)
n  
k=1
c
 
k  m
j=1 c
j
k
wk
 
∈ (0,1),
then in the fully mixed case these probabilities are Nash
probabilities.
By Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.5 we establish:
Theorem 4.6 (Existence and Uniqueness of
Nash Equilibria) Consider the fully mixed case.
Then for every user i ∈ [n] and every link   ∈ [m],
p
 
i =1 −
(m − 1)c
 
i  m
j=1 c
j
i
−
1
n − 1
1
wi
 
n  
k=1
wk
 
1 −
n  
k=1
c
 
k  m
j=1 c
j
k
+
(n − 1)c
 
i  m
j=1 c
j
i
 
− (m − 1)
n  
k=1
c
 
k  m
j=1 c
j
k
wk
 
∈ (0,1)
if and only if there exist a Nash equilibrium which must
be unique and the p 
i’s are its associated Nash probabil-
ities.
Theorem 4.6 implies the following.
Corollary 4.7 The fully mixed Nash equilibrium when
it exists can be calculated in O(nm) time.
From Theorem 4.6 and Lemma 4.3 we get the fol-
lowing result for the model of uniform user beliefs.
Theorem 4.8 Under the model of uniform user be-
liefs, for any game G,l e tF be the fully mixed Nash
equilibrium. Then for any user i ∈ [n] and any link
  ∈ [m] p 
i = 1
m.
4.2 Worst Case Equilibrium and Price of
Anarchy.
We show that the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium
maximizes social cost. Since both social costs are based
on the individual costs of every user i ∈ [n], we ﬁrst
extend a known relation previously shown in related
models [8, 14].
Lemma 4.9 Take any game G, a (mixed) Nash Equi-
libria P and the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F,T h e n
for any user i ∈ [n], λi,bi (P) ≤ λi,bi (F).
Corollary 4.10 In the case where the Fully Mixed
Nash Equilibrium does not exist, then for any prob-
ability matrix F that is derived from Remark 4.4,
Lemma 4.9 still holds.
The following two theorems follow from Lemma 4.9
and the deﬁnition of the social costs.
Theorem 4.11 The fully mixed Nash equilibrium
maximizes the social cost SC1 (G,F).
Theorem 4.12 The fully mixed Nash equilibrium
maximizes the social cost SC2 (G,F)
Corollary 4.10 and Theorems 4.8, 4.11 and 4.12 lead
to the following two theorems (the ﬁrst for the model
of uniform user beliefs and the second for the general
case):
Theorem 4.13 Take any game G and any Nash equi-
librium P under the model of uniform user beliefs, then
(a)
SC1 (G,P)
OPT1 (G)
≤
 
cmax
cmin
 
m + n − 1
m
,
(b)
SC2 (G,P)
OPT2 (G)
≤
 
cmax
cmin
 
m + n − 1
m
,
where cmax = max
i∈[n],  ∈[m]
c 
i,a n dcmin = min
i∈[n],  ∈[m]
c 
i.
Theorem 4.14 Take any game G and any Nash equi-
librium P, then
(a)
SC1 (G,P)
OPT1 (G)
≤
(cmax)2
cmin
1
 m
j=1 c
j
min
(m + n − 1),
(b)
SC2 (G,P)
OPT2 (G)
≤
(cmax)2
cmin
1
 m
j=1 c
j
min
(m + n − 1),
where cmax = max
i∈[n],  ∈[m]
c 
i, cmin = min
i∈[n],  ∈[m]
c 
i,a n d
c 
min = min
i∈[n]
c 
i,  ∈ [m].
It remains open to investigate the tightness of the
above upper bounds. However, based on results intro-
duced in related works [1, 8] we believe these bounds
can be improved.
4.3. Conclusions
In this paper we introduce an extension of the KP-
model where the network links may present a number
of diﬀerent capacities and each user’s uncertainty about
the capacity of the links is modeled via a probability
distribution over all the possibilities. This gives rise toa model with user-speciﬁc payoﬀ functions, where each
user uses its distinct probability distribution to take
decisions as to how to route its traﬃc.
We embark on a study of Nash equilibria and the
price of anarchy in this new model. In particular,
we propose polynomial-time algorithms for computing
some special cases of pure Nash equilibria and we pro-
pose an interesting open problem in this area, that of
the existence of pure Nash equilibria in the general case
of our model. Furthermore, we consider appropriate
notions for the social cost and the price of anarchy and
obtain upper bounds for the latter. With respect to
fully mixed Nash equilibria, we propose a method to
compute them and show that when they exist they are
unique. Finally we prove that the fully mixed Nash
equilibrium maximizes the social welfare.
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